DREAMS.

It were to be wished, for the happiness and quiet of an infinite number of persons, that dreams had never been mentioned as presages of future events ; for those who are once possessed with this notion, imagine that the greatest part of the images that pass through their minds in their sleep, are so many predictions, which very often threaten them with future evils. Hence arise a thousand uneasy thoughts ; and where there is one man who is not subject to this weakness, there are a thousand who are not able to free themselves from it. I think we may say of

dreams the same almost as of inchantments, that they are far less mysterious than people believe, and somewhat more than free-thinkers fancy. The histories of all times and places relate, both with respect to dreams and magic, so many surprising things, that those who obstinately deny them all, render themselves suspected, either of want of sincerity, or judgment to discern the force of the proofs. A violent prejudice, or a certain turn of mind, blinds their understanding, when they compare the reasons pro and con.. I have known some men of parts, who denied all presages from dreams upon this principle,— none but God, said they, know things to come, that is, such as are called contingent: but dreams are generally supposed to foretel contingent futurities; God therefore must be the author of those dreams, and then he must produce them by a miracle; and so, in all the countries of the world, he must work an infinite number of miracles, which are no wise agreeable to the character either of his infinite greatness, or sovereign wisdom. These gentlemen insist strongly upon this, that the most mystical dreams are as common among Pagans and Mahometans, as among the followers of the true religion. In effect, read Plutarch, and the other Greek and Roman historians; read the books of the Arabians and the Chinese, and you will find in them as many examples of miraculous dreams, as in the bible, or in Christian histories. It must be confessed, that this objection is of great force, and seems to lead us necessarily to another system,—that, which attributes these sort of dreams, not to God as the immediate cause, but to certain intelligences, who, under the direction of God have a great share in the government of man. It may be supposed, according to the doctrine of occasional causes, that there are general laws, which subject a great number of effects to the desires of such and such intelligences, as there are general laws, which subject to the desires of men the motion of certain bodies. This supposition is not only agreeable to ma opinion, which was very common among the Pagans, but also to the doctrine of the scripture, and to that of the ancient fathers. The Pagans acknowledged several inferior gods, who presided over particular things, and they pretended also, that each man had a genius that governed him. The Roman Catholics pretend, that the doctrine of a guardian-angel, and of an angel presiding over a whole country, a city, or a province, is founded upon the scripture. If you once lay it down for a truth, that God has thought fit to appoint certain spirits, as the occasional cause of man’s conduct, with respect to certain events, then all the difficulties that are objected against dreams vanish away. We must no more wonder that we do not: find a character of greatness or gravity in the images, which advertise us in dreams. Though they be confused or childish, and though they vary according to times and places, and according to the temperament of men’s bodies, this ought not to surprise those, who know the narrow bounds of creatures, and the obstacles which occasional causes, of different kinds, must needs reciprocally raise against one another. Do we not find by experience, every day, that our soul and our body mutually hinder each other in those operations that are peculiar to them? an intelligence, that should act both upon our body and our mind, must needs find divers obstacles in the laws, which establish these two principles, as the occasional cause of certain effects. But whence comes it, may some ask, that these invisible genii do not make use of a fitter time? Why do they not advertise men of things future, while they are awake? Why do they wait till they are asleep? “Illud etiam requiro, cur, si deus ista visa nobis providendi causa dat, non vigilantibus potius det quàm dormientibus? Sive enim externus, & adventitius pulsus animos dormientium commovet, sive per se ipsi animi moventur, sive quae causa alia est, cur secundum quietem aliquid videre, audire, agere videamur, eadem causa vigilantibus esse poterat: idque si nostra causa dii secundum quietem facerent, vigilantibus idem facerent; praesertim cum Chrysippus, Academicos refellens, permulto clariora, & certiora esse dicat, quae vigilantibus videantur quam - quae somniantibus. Fuit igitur divina beneficentia dignius, cum consuleret nobis, clariora visa dare vigilantibus, quam obscuriora, per somnium: quod quoniam non fit, somnia divina putanda non sunt. Jam vero quid opus est circuitione, & amfractu, ut sit utendum interpretibus somniorum potius quam directo? Deus, si quidem nobis consulebat, Hoc facito, Hoc ne feceris, diceret? idque visum vigilanti potius, quam dormienti daret? Cicero, de Divinat. lib. ii. cap. lxi. ² - - - I likewise ask, why, if God gives us these visions, for the sake of fore-sight, he does not rather give them us when awake, than when asleep? For, whether an external and adventitious impulse affects the minds of the sleepers, or their minds are moved of themselves, or there be any other cause, why, in our sleep, we seem to see, hear, or do any thing; the same might be affected in those that are awake: and if the gods did this for our sakes, when we are asleep, they would do the same when we are awake, especially since Chrysippus, refuting the academics, says, that our waking ideas are much more clear and certain than our sleeping ones. It were therefore more worthy of the Divine Goodness,in consulting our benefit, to give us clearer visions when awake, than more obscure in sleep; which not being done, dreams are not to be considered as divine. Besides, where is the use of the round-about way of consulting interpreters of dreams, rather than the direct? For if God considered our good, he would say.—'Do this, avoid doing that:’ and would present such a vision rather to our waking, than to our sleeping thoughts.” Why do they communicate their predictions to people of weak minds, rather than to those of stronger heads? It is easily answered, that those who are awake, are not proper to be thus advertised; for then they consider themselves as the cause of every thing that presents itself to their imagination, and clearly distinguish between what they imagine, and what they see. But when they are asleep, they do not distinguish between their imaginations and sensations; all the objects, which they imagine, appear to them to be present, and they cannot retain exactly the coherence of their images: and so they cannot persuade themselves that they have not connected them together themselves; whence they conclude that some of them proceed from other causes, and Were inspired by some spirit, that would advertise them of something. Can it be denied, that an engine is fitter to be played in a certain manner, when some of its parts are at rest, and when they are not? Let us say the same of our brain. It is more easy to direct in it certain motions for exciting presaging imaginations when the eyes, and other external senses, are locked up, than when they are in action. Do we know how far the effects of sickness or madness may assist the authors of dreams? can we doubt, but that the laws of motion, according to which our organs are moved, and which are only to a certain degree subject to the desires of created spirits, trouble and confound the images, which the author of a dream would render more distinct? Cicero seems to triumph, upon pretence that these images are obscure and intricate. “Jam vero quid opus est circuitione, & amfractu, ut sit utendum interpretibus somniorum potius, quam direoto? -- -- -- -- Venit in contentionem, sit probabilius, deosne immortales, rerum omnium præstantia excellentes, concursare omnium mortalium, qui ubique sunt, non modo lectos, verum etiam grabatos, & cùm stertentes aliquos viderent, objicere his quædam tortuosa, & obscura, quae illi exterriti somnio ad conjectorem manè deferant: an natura fieri, ut mobiliter animus agitatus, quod vigilans viderit, dormiens videre videatur. Cicero, de Divinat. lib. ii. cap. lxiil. ³ - - - - Besides, where is the use of such a roundabout way of consulting interpreters of dreams, rather than the direct? . . . . It is disputed whether it be more probable that the immortal gods, who excel in all perfection, run up and down, and surround not only the beds, but the very couches of all men, everywhere; and when they find any asleep, present to their imaginations some intricate and obscure ideas, which, terrified by the vision, they are to carry in the morning to an interpreter; or that it happens by a natural effect, that the mind being put into motion, seems to see in sleep what it really saw when awake.” But to this it may be answered, that every creature is limited and imperfect; there may therefore be variations, and even some oddities, according to our way of judgment in the effects, which are directed by the desires of a created spirit. This may serve us as an answer to some objections, which the Freethinkers allege to those who talk to them about the existence of magic; in fine, I affirm that the knowledge of things future is not so great as is imagined, in supposing that there are dreams of divination: for if we duly examine the common relations and popular tradition, most of these dreams inform us only of such things as happen in other countries, or such as are quickly to come to pass. A man dreams of the death of a friend or relation, and it is found, say they, that this friend or relation died fifty leagues off at the time of this dream. To reveal such a thing as this, does not imply the knowledge of things to come; others dream of I know not what, that threatens them with some misfortune as with death, for instance. The genius who is the author of this dream, may know the plots and devices which are framing against them; it may see in the state of the blood, a near disposition to an apoplexy, a pleurisy, or some other mortal disease; but this is not to know things future which are called contingent. But some may say there are private persons who have dreamed that they should reign, and they did not reign till twenty or thirty years after; I answer that their genius being of a very high order, active and wise, had a mind to raise them to a throne; he was resolved to lay hold of every opportunity, and did not doubt of success; and from these conjectures, which were almost certain, he imparted the dream. Men would do as much proportionably to their ability.

I do not produce these things as proofs or strong reasons, but only as answers to the difficulties which are proposed against the common opinion; and it must also be considered that I confine myself within the bounds of natural light; for I suppose the disputants would not make use of the authority of scripture. I desire also that it may be observed, that those who maintain there are dreams of divination, need only weaken the objections of their adversaries, for they have an infinite number of facts to allege for their opinion, as have those also who maintain that there is such a thing as magic; and this being so, it is sufficient for them that they can answer objections: but it belongs to those who deny these facts, to prove that they are impossible, and without this they will never gain the cause. I ought also to put the reader in mind, that I do not pretend to excuse the ancient Pagans, either as to the care they took to relate so many dreams in their histories, or as to the proceedings that were consequent upon certain dreams. Sometimes they had no other foundation for appointing certain ceremonies, or for condemning the accused. “Quum exæde Herculis patera aurea gravis surrepta esset, in somniis vidit (Sophocles) ipsum

deum dicentem, qui id fecisset. Quod semel ille, iterumque neglexit, ubi idem sæpius ascendit in Areopagum: detulit rem. Areopagitæ comprehendi jubent eum, qui à Sophocle erat nominatus. Is, quæstione adhibita, confessus est, pateramque retulit. Quo facto, fanum illud Indicis Herculis nominatum est. Cicero, de Divinat. lib. iii. ⁴ A large golden goblet being stolen out of the temple of Hercules, Sophocles in a dream saw the god himself telling him who had done it. He disregarded the vision once and twice, but it being repeated, he went to the court of Areopagus, and gave information of the matter. The Areopagites ordered the person whom Sophocles had named, to be arrested; upon examination by torture, he confessed the fact and restored the goblet: whence that temple received the name of Hercules the discoverer.” One may justly laugh at the weakness of Augustus, and much more at die law which enjoined all private persons in certain countries, who had dreamed any thing concerning the republic, to declare it openly, either by a public advertisement or by a cryer; and excepting some particular dreams, we may say of all the rest what we read in Petronius. “Hinc scies epicurum hominem esse divinum, qui ejusmodi ludibria facetissimâ ratione condemnat.

“Somnia, quæ mentes ludunt volitantibus umbris
Non delubra deum, nee ab æthere numina mittunt;
Sed aibi quisque facit. Nam cum prostrata sopore
Urget membra quies, et mens sine pondere ludit:
Quidquid luce fecit, tenebris agit. Oppida bello
Qui quatit, et flammis miserandas sævit in urbes, &c.

“Hence you may know that Epicurus was a Godlike philosopher, who very justly and pleasantly condemns these idle notions.

“Dreams which delude the mind with fleeting shades
Come not from temples or the gods above;

Each his own visions makes: for stretch’d in sleep,

When slumber looses the material chains,
The active mind in airy visions sports,
And acts in dreams the business of the day.
The soldier dreams of war and cities fired, &c.”

And I continue in the same opinion which I have declared elsewhere, that there is no employment more frivolous and ridiculous than that of the Onirocritics. If we would compare with what happens to us, an infinite number of images that arise in our minds, when being awake, we abandon ourselves to all objects that offer themselves, we might find in them as much relation to our adventures, as in any dreams which we look upon as presages. But, say they, we not only see in a dream the objects, but we hear them tell us such things as we never heard when we were awake, and consequently of which we could have no traces in our brain. We sometimes believe that we see in a dream, a new book which we have never heard of before, and we read the title, preface, and a hundred other things in it. This reason is of no force: do we not all this while we are awake? Do we not represent to ourselves such and such persons, who tell us a hundred things which we ourselves frame? Cannot we imagine, if we please, that such a one has just now published such a book which contains such and such things? Thus this pretended great reason is of no weight, but I believe at the same time, that we cannot doubt of certain dreams which are mentioned by authors, neither can we explain them by natural causes, I mean without acknowledging an inspiration or a revelation. See Valerius Maximus, lib. i. cap. 7, and the letters of Grotius, epist. cccv. part 2. As to the objections of Cicero, which are indeed very strong and almost unanswerable, they are of no strength but upon the supposition that God himself is the immediate author of our dreams. It was the supposition of the Stoics, whence it comes to pass that Cotta speaks thus:

“Quomodo iidem dicitis non omnia deos persequii iidem vultis à diis immortalibus hominibus dispartiri ac dividi somnia? Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. in sub fin. ⁵ - - - - How comes it that you say the gods do not perform all things, and at the same time affirm that all dreams proceed from them?” “Primum igitur” Cicero de Divinat. lib. ii. cap. ix. ⁶ says he, “intelligendum est, nullam vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum. Atque illud quidem perspicuum est, nulla visa somniorum proficisci à numine deorum. Nostra enim causa dii id facerent, ut providere futura possemus. Quotus igitur est quisque, qui somniis pareat? qui intelligat? qui meminerit? quàm multi verb, qui contemnant; eamque superstitionem imbecilli animi, atque anilis putent? Quid est igitur, cur his hominibus consulens deus, somniis moneat eos, qui ilia non modo cura, sed ne memoria quidem digna ducant? nec enim ignorare deus potest, qua mente quisque sit: nec frustra, ac sine causa quid facere, dignum deo est: quod abhorret etiam ab hominis Constantia. Ita si pleraque somnia aut ignorantur, aut negliguntur; aut nescit hoc deus, aut frustra somniorum significatione utitur. Sed horum neutrum in deum cadit. Nihil igitur à deo somniis significari fatendum est. In the first place, we are to understand that dreams cannot be caused by any divine power, and this is very evident, that no visions of dreams proceed from the gods; for the gods would do it for our sakes, that we might foresee future events. But how few obey dreams, how few understand them, or remember them? and how many there are who despise them, and think them the superstition of a weak and doating mind? Why then should God, consulting the good of these men, admonish by dreams such as think them not only unworthy of their regard, but even of their remembrance? Nor can God be ignorant of the disposition of each man’s mind, and it is unworthy of God to do any thing in vain and without reason, which is abhorrent even from human constancy; therefore, if most dreams are either forgotten or neglected, either God knows not this, or he sends dreams to no purpose; but neither of these can be true of God: we must therefore acknowledge that nothing is signified to us in dreams from God. This is his first reason; we have already seen the second; here follows the third. Cicero de Divinat. cap. lxi, lxii. ⁷ “Jam verb quis dicere audeat, vera omnia esse somnia? Aliquot somnia vera inquit Ennius, sed omnia non est necesse. Quæ est tandem ista distinctio? quæ vera, quæ falsa habet? et si vera à deo mittuntur, falsa unde nascuntur? nam si ea quoque divina, quid inconstantius deo? quid inscitius au tern est, quam mentes mortalium falsis, et mendacibus visis concitare? sin vera visa divina sunt: falsa autem, et inania humana: quæ est ista designandi licentia, ut hoc deus, hoc natura fecerit potius, quam aut omnia deus, quod negatis, aut omnia natura? - - -And now who will venture to say that all dreams are true? Some dreams, Ennius tells us, must necessarily be true, but not all. What distinction is this? and how shall we know which are true, which are false? and if the true are sent by God, whence proceed the false? for if they likewise are divine, can any thing be more inconstant than the Deity? and what can be more ignorant than to stir up the minds of men by false and lying visions? But if true dreams are divine, and the false and empty, human, what liberty is this of distinguishing and saying, that God does this and nature that, rather than that all is done by God alone, which you deny, or by nature alone?” He proposes a fourth, founded upon the obscurity of dreams, which has been already considered, but let us consider it a little better. “There is no one,” says he, “who has sufficient capacity to expound dreams aright; if therefore, the gods speak to us in this way, it will be as if the Carthaginians should harangue the senate of Rome in their own language, and bring no interpreter with them. “Vide igitur, ne etiam si divinationem tibi esse concessero, quod nunquam faciam, neminem tamen divinum reperire possimus. Qualis autern ista mens est deorum si neque ea nobis significant in somniis, quæ ipsi per nos intelligamus: neque ea, quorum interpretes habere possimus? similes enim sunt dii, si ea nobis objiciunt, quorum nec scientiam neque explanatorem habeamus, tanquam si Pœni, aut Hispani in senatu nostro loquerentur sine interprete. Jam verò quo pertinent obscuritates, et ænigmata somniorum? intelligi enim à nobis dii velle debebant ea, quæ nostra causa nos monerent. Cicero de Divinat. cap. lxiv. ⁸ - — But supposing I should grant you that there is such a thing as divination, which I never will, perhaps even this may not lead us to a Divine Being. For what kind of mind is that of the gods, if they neither signify those things to us in dreams, which we may of ourselves understand, nor those of which we can find interpreters? for if the Gods throw such things before us, as we have neither knowledge nor interpreter of, it is the same thing as if the Carthaginians or Spaniards should speak in our senate without an interpreter. Besides, to what purpose serves the obscure and enigmatical nature of dreams? for the Gods ought to desire that we should understand those things, which they admonish us of for our own sakes.” —Art. Majus.