Doctrine of the Jesuit Mariana.

John Mariana wrote a book which Spain and Italy suffered to go abroad, and which was burnt at Paris by a decree of the parliament, because of the pernicious doctrine it contained. There is nothing more seditious, nor more capable of exposing kingdoms to frequent revolutions, and even the lives of princes to the knife of assassins, than this book of John Mariana.

The title of it is, “de Rege et Regis Institutione,” and it was printed at Toledo in the year 1598, with the king’s licence, and the usual approbations. The author having proposed in the sixth chapter of the first book, to consider whether it be lawful to kill a tyrant, enters on this subject with a narrative of the tragical end of Henry III. He admires the courage of James Clement, and says there were different opinions about the action of this young monk: some commended it, and thought it worthy of immortality; others blamed it, because they were of opinion that it is never lawful for a mere private man to kill a prince declared king by the nation, and anointed with the sacred oil according to custom, although this prince become a wicked man and a tyrant. “De facto monachi non una opinio fuit, multis laudantibus atque immortalitate dignum judicantibus: vitupérant alii prudentiæ & eruditionis laude præstantes, fas

esse negantes cuiquam privata auctoritate regem consensu populi renunciatum, sacroque oleo de more delibutum sanctumque adeo perimere, sit ille quamvis perditis moribus, atque in tyrannidem degenerant.” Mariana, de Rege & Regis Institutione, lib. i, cap. vi, pag. 54. ⁶⁸ We may clearly perceive, that Mariana is one of those who approved the action of James Clement; for he rejects the principle upon which wise and learned men condemned it. Besides, he affects to extol the courage and undaunted steadiness of this assassin, without dropping one word that tends to render him odious to the reader. This observation admirably discovers the whole venom of the doctrine of this Jesuit; for it is certain that he only begins with the example of Henry III, that he might descend from the thesis to the hypothesis, and to show the people a notable case of tyranny, that so at all times, when they should find themselves in the like condition, they might think that their circumstances warranted them to make use of the knife against their monarchs. But if it be once lawful to do this, when people live under such a prince as Henry III, I know not what monarchs ought not to fear that they shall be assassinated or dethroned: for oftentimes the good and evil of two conditions are counterbalanced when they are compared together. If the faults of government are not the same as they were under Henry III, yet it will be said, that all things duly considered, they are equal, and thence people will conclude, that they are in the same condition which the Jesuit has described. However let us go on with the explication of his system.

Mariana relates the reasons of those who blamed James Clement, that is to say, according to him, the reasons of those who teach that every one must patiently submit to the tyrannical yoke of his lawful sovereign; and before he answers them, he produces the arguments of the contrary party, built upon this

fundamental principle, that the authority of the people is superior to that of kings. This is his beloved position, for proof of which he spends two whole chapters. Having alleged the reasons of each party, he declares—I, That according to the opinions of divines and philosophers, a prince who, by main force, and without the general consent of the people, is possessed of the sovereign power, is one whom every private person has a right to kill: “Perimi à quocunque, vita & principatu spoliari posse.—May be killed by any one, and deprived of his life and crown.” II. That if a prince, who is lawfully created, or who is a lawful successor to his ancestors, overturn the religion and public laws, without hearkening to the remonstrances of the nation, may be made away by the safest and surest method. III. That the shortest and surest way of doing it, is to assemble the states, and in this assembly to depose him, and there to order that an army be raised against him, if it be necessary for removing his tyranny. IV. That such a prince may be lawfully put to death, and that each private person, who shall have the courage to attempt to kill him, has a right to do it. V. That if an assembly of the states cannot be held, and it appear nevertheless to be the will of the people that the tyrant should be dispatched, there is no private person but may lawfully kill this prince to satisfy the desire of the people: “Qui votis publicis favens eum perimere tentavit, haud quaquam inique eum fecisse existimabo. He who to accomplish what is wished by the people, shall attempt to kill him, I shall not judge him to have acted at all unjustly.” VI. That the judgment of a private person, or of many, is not sufficient; but one must be governed by the voice of the people, and also consult grave and learned men. VII. That, indeed, it shows greater courage to rise up openly against the tyrant; but there is no less prudence to attack him secretly, and destroy him in the snares that are laid for him. “Est quidem majoris virtutis & animi simultatem aperte exercere, palam in hostem reipublicæ irrnere: sed non minoris prudentiæ, fraudi & insidiis locum captare, quod sine motu contingat minori certe periculo publico atque private.” He advises therefore, either that he should be attacked in his own palace with open force, or that a conspiracy should be formed against him; he will have it that open war, crafty devices, frauds, and treacheries, are equally lawful; and if the conspirators, adds he, are not killed in the attempt, they ought to be admired as heroes all their life time; if they perish in it, then they fall victims acceptable to God and men, and their efforts deserve immortal praises. VIII. That although there seems to be no difference between an assassin who kills with the stab of a knife, and one who poisons; yet because Christianity has abrogated the laws of the Athenians, which ordered criminals to drink a poisoned cup; Mariana does not approve that a tyrant should be killed by poison mixed with his meat; but if any would make use of poison, he would have it applied to his clothes or to his saddle. “Ergo me auctore neque noxium medicamentum hosti detur, neque lethale venenum in cibo & potu temperetur in ejus pernicem. Hoc tamen temperamento uti, in hac quidem disputatione licebit, si non ipse qui perimitur venenum haurire cogitur, quo intimis medullis concepto pereat: sed exterius ab alio adhibeatur nihil adjuvante eo qui perimendus est. Nimirum cum tanta vis est veneni, ut sella eo aut veste delibuta vim interficiendi habeat.”

Such is the system of this Jesuit. The last part of it is very absurd; it is a ridiculous distinction, for he who drinks poison without knowing it, and believing it to be good food, does not any ways contract the guilt of those who destroy themselves; and yet to preserve a tyrant from so great a crime, Mariana would not have him made to drink or eat poison.

Moreover, if it were true, that in drinking off the poison without knowing of it, he would be guilty of his own death; he would be no less guilty in putting on a poisoned shirt: and yet Mariana makes no scruple to consent, that his clothes should be poisoned, his saddles, or any other things which act from without upon the inward parts. I say therefore, that the eighth article of this Jesuit is unworthy of a man who understands reasoning; and I am surprised, that a man who had so much good sense, and so much logic, should trifle so childishly. Abating this, many people are persuaded that his system is finely contrived, that the parts of it are well connected together, and that he proceeds naturally from one consequence to another. Suppose once they say, that a king holds of the people, as being his supreme judge, and that he is accountable to them, all the rest will follow of course; and therefore the author who refuted Mariana, laid down a principle quite opposite to this, viz. that sovereign princes depend only upon God, to whom alone it belongs to call them to an account. I shall not enter upon the discussion of this question; but shall only observe, that as the doctrines of Mariana are very destructive of the public good, it had been better that he had argued inconsequently, than to follow, like a good logician, the consequences of his principle.—Art. Mariana.