ORACLES.

Agesipolis, king of Lacedemon, once sent to Delphi to know if the opinion of Apollo was agreeable to that given on the famous olympian temple of Jupiter.

We may hence collect a truth, which is otherwise evident enough; namely, that the Pagan religion was founded upon notions of the Deity as false as atheism. I do not speak of the sentiments of the common people only, or the abuse of particular persons: I speak of the public worship, performed by the most eminent persons, and supported by the authority of the state. We have here an instance of a king of Lacedemon, who, after having offered solemn sacrifices, as preparative to an expedition, and even after a favourable answer from the greatest of the gods, goes and consults another Deity, being uncertain whether he will contradict, or confirm this answer. He was therefore of opinion, that the decisions of Jupiter could not always be followed with a safe conscience, and he supposed, that the sentiments of Apollo were not always conformable to those of Jupiter. Was not this to believe, that all the gods, without excepting the greatest, were limited in their knowledge, and that between them and men there was only the difference of more or less? At this rate, the “tot capita, tot sensus, so many men, so many minds," was applicable to inhabitants of heaven, as well as earth. They consulted Jupiter, as we consult the most famous advocate of parliament, when we intend to commence a law suit. This advocate's answer does not satisfy a cautious client; but he desires to have the advice of other counsel; and some persons consult the most able doctors in every court of the kingdom. The Pagans did so with respect to their oracles: they consulted several of them upon the same point, to see whether the gods would contradict each other, and to take their measures the better, by comparing their respective answers. Thus their gods were as chimerical, as the deity of Spinoza; for it is as impossible that a limited nature should be God, as it is impossible that the world should be the Supreme Being which governs all things by a wise Providence. To confirm what is here advanced concerning the false idea which the Pagans entertained of God: they were not scandalized at the different fate of their victims. Those which were offered to one divinity encouraged their hopes, while those offered to another alarmed their fears. Apollo and Diana, twins of Jupiter, often contradicted each other; the brother rejecting an offering, the sister accepting it. Paganism found nothing scandalous in this. The heathens would willingly have found a greater harmony in the promises of good things; but in short they did not believe that the Divine Nature was free from ignorance, caprice, and disagreement; so that they acquiesced in this, as an unavoidable effect of the nature of things. We must not imagine, that Cicero’s objections opened the eyes of many among them. “Quid quum pluribus diis immolatur, qui tandem evenit ut litetur aliis, aliis non litetur? Quæ autem inconstantia deorum est, ut primis minentur extis, bene promittant secundis? Aut tanta inter eos dissensio, sæpe etiam inter proximos, ut Apollinis exta bona sint, Dianæ non bona? Cicero de Divinat. lib. 2, c. 17. ¹⁰³—Whence is it, that in consulting several gods at a time, we sacrifice to some and not to others? And what inconstancy of the gods is it, to threaten in the first entrails, but to appear propitious in the second? Or is there such a disagreement among them, even those the nearest related, that Apollo’s victims shall promise success, but Diana’s not?”

A modern author has made use of this conduct of Agesipolis, to shew that, in relation to the oracles, the greatest of the gods of Paganism did not preserve his advantage or his superiority. He says, La Mothe le Vayer. ¹⁰⁴ " The oracles of Jupiter, such as those of Trophonius, Dodona, and Hammon, had not so much credit as that

of Delphi, for they never equalled the latter either in esteem, or in duration. And this is proved by what Xenophon reports of Agesipolis, who, after having consulted Jupiter Olympius, and received his answer, had recourse to Apollo at Delphi, as a judge without appeal, whether he was of the same opinion with his father. Aristotle imputes this kind of religious ridicule to one Hegesippus in the second book of his Rhetorics.” This passage furnishes matter for two observations. The first is, that the notions of the Gallican church concerning the council and the Pope, though speaking ex cathedra, may be compared to those of Paganism concerning the oracles of Jupiter, and of Delphi. The olympian Jupiter, when he answered a question, met with great esteem in the minds of the people; much deference was paid to his authority; but in short, his opinion, though delivered ex cathedra or rather ex tripode, did not pass for infallible. Behold the Pope of the Gallican church! The Apollo of Delphi was the judge without appeal: Behold the council! My second observation is, That Agesipolis was in earnest in what he did; there was no religious banter in the case. As for what concerns Hegesippus, I answer nothing for him. He was perhaps malicious enough to attempt ensnaring the oracles, that he might insult them if they did not agree. He might have said, “It is a shame for you to answer yes, and no.” Hegesippus, having received an answer from the god at Olympia, interrogated him at Delphi, whether he was of the same opinion with his father, as if it were scandalous for the gods to disagree in their answers. Aristot. Rhetor. lib. 2, cap. 25, pag. 445, F. ¹⁰⁵ If Agesipolis had had any ill design against Apollo, in imitation of that malicious person, whose story Æsop relates, Æsop in his sixteenth fable, whose title is “ The Malicious.” He was one who held a sparrow in his hand, and asked the oracle, “ Is what I have in my hand alive or not?” His design was to have killed the sparrow, if the oracle had answered “ It is alive.” ¹⁰⁶ he would have been defeated; for the answer of Delphi was the same with that of Olympia.— Art. Agesipolis.