LACTANTIUS.

(His Arguments against Philosophy.)

Lactantius pretends to destroy all philosophy, by maintaining with Socrates, that we can know nothing, and, with Zeno, that nothing is to be believed, but what we know. “Si neque sciri,” says he, “quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, nec opinari oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est.” He confirms his pretence by the great number of sects into which philosophy was divided. Each engrossed truth and wisdom to itself, and made error and folly the portion of all the rest. So that whatever particular sect we would condemn, we have the suffrages of all the other philosophers, who are not of that sect. We are sure then of a majority in condemning them all; for each in particular approves our judgment as to all the rest; and has nothing to oppose, in bar against a general sentence, but the testimony it gives itself; in which case it is a judge in its own cause, and consequently unworthy of credit. “They destroy each other,” says he, “like Cadmus's brood, not one of them is left alive; and the reason is, because they have, indeed, each a sword, but no buckler: they have arms for an offensive, but not for a defensive war.” Arcesilas observing this, took up arms against them all, and founded a new sect of philosophy, which consisted in not philosophising at all. He introduced a kind of wavering, uncertain philosophy; for in order to know, that nothing can be known, we must necessarily know something; for if you know nothing at all, this very knowledge, that nothing can be known, will be destroyed. He therefore who gives it as his opinion that nothing is known, professes to know something; something therefore may be known. Akin to this is that example of this kind of philosophy usually proposed in the schools; that

a certain person dreamt that he ought not to believe in dreams. For if he did believe in them, it follows, that he ought not to believe in them; but if he did not believe in them, it follows, that he ought to believe in them. Thus, if nothing can be known, we must necessarily know this very thing, that nothing is known. But if it be known, that nothing can be known, it is false which is pretended that nothing can be known. Thus an opinion is advanced which is repugnant to, and destructive of itself.” Lastly, Lactantius confesses, that with relation to physics, there is no such thing as science, and that it ought not to be so much as sought after. “How much more wisely and truly would Arcesilas have reasoned if he had said only, that the causes and reasons of heavenly or natural things, as being hid, could not be known; since there is no teacher to instruct us in them; and that we ought not to inquire after them, since no inquiry will discover them?”

Let us briefly observe on this dispute. The argument which Lactantius makes use of to overthrow all the sects of philosophy by each other, proves too much. An atheist, who should make use of it, at present, to overthrow the Christian religion, would reason ill; the Christian sects mutually condemn each other; I grant it; but if you should condemn any one of them in all its doctrinal points, you would not have the suffrages of all the rest. Lactantius contradicts himself wretchedly. He confesses, that if there be no science among men, Arcesilas gains the victory; and he pretends to have demonstrated, that we are too frail to attain to science. Why then does he presently add, that Arcesilas loses the victory, because there are actually several sciences among men? The examples he alleges are nothing to the purpose; for in the sense in which the word is taken in this dispute, it is not science to discern good from bad; nor has this kind of knowledge been called in question by the

Acataleptics. The charge of contradiction has less of solidity in it than of false lustre; it is rather a subtilty than a convincing reason; good sense soon unravels the difficulty. If I dream that I ought not to believe in dreams, I am caught in a dilemma; for if I do not believe in them, I do believe in them; and if I do believe in them, I do not believe in them. Who sees not, that, in this case, the particular dream, which advises me not to believe in dreams, must be excepted from all other dreams? See, in “Sextus Empiricus,” what the Sceptics replied to this objection. Lactantius’s concession as to physics was not at all proper to his design: an advantage might be drawn from it against his own cause.—Art. Arcesilas.