IGNORANCE.

(Sins of)

Gregory of Rimini maintained that an invincible ignorance does not justify a man. Mr Arnauld who makes this observation, afterwards mentions three opinions upon the subject. The first is, “that a human action is not a formal sin, if he who does it does not know that he commits a sin.” He ascribes this opinion to the Jesuits, and affirms that they pretend to say nothing but what is reasonable; because it is agreed on all hands, as they suppose, that an invincible ignorance justifies a man, and that he is reputed to be invincibly ignorant of the sinfulness of

what he does, when he has no such thought in the doing it. The second opinion is that of several divines, who lest these false subtleties should overthrow this important maxim, that the ignorance of the law of nature does not justify a man, which has been acknowledged by the Heathens themselves, and is laid down in the canon law in these words, “Ignorantia juris omnibus adultis damnabilis est: Ignorance of the law in all adult persons is damnable maintain /that it ought not to be looked upon as invincible, absolutely speaking, because that law is such, that man was made capable to know it, and would have known it, if he had continued in the state wherein God had placed him; that in the state he is in, it is one of the consequences of original sin that he knows only the first principles of it, and is ignorant of the rest, which he may however know with the assistance of grace. This, according to St Thomas, is sufficient to oblige men to do what they cannot do without grace; though that grace, without which they cannot do it, be given to some out of mercy, and be denied to others out of justice, as a punishment of preceding sin, although but original sin. Nothing can be more express than what this angelical doctor teaches upon this subject; and according to this second opinion, which has been entertained by most of the ancient Divines, the ignorance of the law of nature did never justify any body, because it could not be looked upon as invincible.

The third opinion is that of Gregorius Ariminensis, of Estius, and other divines, who taking the word invincible in another sense, do not scruple to assert that the ignorance of the law of nature does not justify a man, even when it might be looked upon as invincible. For, say they, it may be called invincible with respect to human means, such as instruction, of which many people have been deprived, especially among the infidels. Those, who, taking the word invincible in this sense, have acknowledged that a

vast number of Heathens have been invincibly ignorant of many duties of the law of nature, should necessarily have said, that the ignorance of the law of nature does not clear men from sin, even when it may be called invincible, with respect to the want of human, and even divine means, when God does not afford those, that would be immediately necessary to overcome that ignorance. We have still some theses publicly asserted in our days at Rome in the school of the Augustins, wherein this proposition is to be found:"ignorantia invincibilis juris naturalis non excusât à peccato.” So that it is not very long since they publicly asserted at Rome, that an invincible ignorance does not clear men from sin, and nobody was offended at it; nor was it believed that they who ascribed that opinion to St Augustin, and to Gregorius Ariminensis, one of his most faithful disciples among the school-men, imposed upon that father. Estius did also teach the same doctrine in express words. Mr Arnauld adds that the difference between the two last opinions is but a dispute about words, and that at the bottom each of them perfectly agrees with the general maxim of the canon-law, and the doctrine of St Augustin against the Pelagians, and that of St Bernard against Abelard; that whatever is done against the law of nature is a sin, in whatever manner one may be ignorant of it, because it is always a punishment of some sin, as St Augustin says in his letter to Sixtus. But the first opinion, which is that of the Jesuits, totally overthrows the maxim of the canon-law, and the doctrine of holy men, by generally asserting on one hand that an invincible ignorance always justifies men; and on the other by stretching so far the word invincible whenever they please, that if they would speak sincerely, they should say that the sins of ignorance are never formal sins, but only material.

I thought fit to mention all these things, not only because they afford us a short and useful instruction about a very difficult and important subject, but also because they discover to us that our Gregorius Ariminensis did not use any evasion and subterfuge. He dived into the bottom of a doctrine, he perceived the most natural consequences of a principle, and owned them boldly, without seeking any equivocal or mitigated expressions. I do not say this, to condemn those who endeavour to soften what they think might offend their readers. They may have a good design, and some matters are so difficult and intricate, that we may well excuse those who use sometimes a different method to explain them. The question about sins of ignorance is one of that kind: it is surrounded with precipices. It is therefore no wonder if those, who walk in such a way, do sometimes turn aside or go back. They grant one thing, and then they oppose it: they give with one hand what they take away with the other. They will grant “that an invincible ignorance excuses men, both in fact and right,” and then they will allege a great many examples, taken from holy scripture, to show that the sins of ignorance do not excuse men; and the necessary result of those quotations must be, either that the ignorance of moral duties was never invincible, or that, though it is invincible, it does not excuse a sinner. If you consider narrowly all their arguments, you will find that they have supposed that ignorance of right or of fact is never a sin, but when it is not invincible; they leave, properly speaking, no case wherein that ignorance is invincible; for, they say, it may be overcome with respect to the passion of Jesus Christ, even when it has never been heard of. They pretend, that if a savage of America be ignorant of the matters of fact contained in the New Testament it is his fault, because he has not put himself in a disposition that may move God to reveal to him the mysteries of the

salvation, and has made himself unworthy of that heavenly favour. Ask them this question; could he have that good disposition that you speak of? could he make a good use of the light of nature? They will answer you, that he could if he would. If you ask them whether he could have such a will? I think they will answer you, that he could not, but that it was only a moral impotency, which is nothing else but the ill disposition of his will, and a consequence of the corruption wherewith the children of Adam are born. This is at the bottom the same doctrine with that of our Gregory, and I think it were better to say plainly, as he does, that an invincible ignorance can be no excuse when it proceeds from original sin, and is a punishment for it. It is true that this doctrine is liable to some inconveniences; for it seems to lead one by degrees to this assertion, frenzy and madness can be no excuse, since they ought not to be excluded from the number of evils which have been introduced by sin, and which serve as a punishment for sin. But is not the first opinion, mentioned by Mr Arnauld, also liable to many inconveniences? The question is not to chuse between an opinion free from all intricacies and one that is very intricate; but the question is to chuse between two extremes, whereof one is contrary to philosophical notions, and the other to the theological systems.—Art. Rimini. JUPITER.
(His employment.)

Chilo, one of the seven wise men of Greece, it is not well known where and when, having asked Æsop what was the employment of Jupiter, received this answer: “he lowers things that are high, and raises those that are low.” Without doubt, this answer is an exact epitome of the history of mankind. Take that history at which end you please, and, follow the course

of it from the beginning to the end, you will see every where instances of the alternative meant by Æsop. The world is a true wheel of fortune, where every thing by turns ascends and descends, and wherein we ought to admire the depths of a wise providence, and the activity of our passions. Does a man grow rich, his children, brought up in wealth, are puffed up with vanity, become prodigal, and ruin themselves. The children of the latter, having nothing to trust to but their industry, labour day and night to enrich themselves, and succeed accordingly. A kingdom requires great power; they grow proud, and treat their neighbours haughtily: each fearing to be subdued, to secure themselves from danger, make such formidable leagues, that they humble the prince who raised himself so high. This rule is not without its exceptions; for there are families and states who preserve their grandeur a long time. The Roman Commonwealth, which pulled down so many sovereigns, increased in greatness for many ages. The Pagans were so thoroughly persuaded that heaven purposely humbled high things, that they feigned there were some Gods, who were filled with jealousy at the prosperity of men. The philosophers themselves, who denied a providence, acknowledged I know not what, which affected to overthrow great things.

Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, et pulcros fasces, sævasque secures
Proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.
Lucret. lib. v. ver. 1233.

And hence we fancy unseen powers in things,
Whose force and will such strange confusion brings,
It spurns and overthrows our greatest kings. Creech.

If man were not an undisciplinable animal, would he not have been cured of his pride after so many proofs of Æsop’s maxim, reiterated in every country, and

in every age? Two thousand years hence, if the world should last so long, the continual revolutions of the wheel will have made no changes in the heart of man. Art. Æsop.