OMENS.

Pericles learned of Anaxagoras to fear the gods without superstition. The Athenians were alarmed without any reason, as soon as any uncommon phenomenon appeared in the air; they looked upon them as signs of the anger of the gods. The philosopher Anaxagoras freed Pericles from that fear, explaining to him by natural reasons the apparition of those meteors; and having thus inspired him with a more rational religion, he was not disturbed with superstitious fears, but expected heavenly favours with a quiet mind. Plut. in Pericle, p. 154, 57. ¹⁰²

What follows in Plutarch deserves to be taken notice of. It happened one day, that a ram’s head had but one horn, which was brought to Pericles. That ram was yeaned in a country house of Pericles. Lampon, the diviner, declared that it was a sign that the power of the two factions which were then in Athens, would fall into the hands of the person in whose house that prodigy happened. Anaxagoras went another way to work. He dissected that monster, and finding the scull smaller than it should be, and of an oval figure, he explained the reason why that ram had but one horn, and why it came out in the middle of the forehead. That method of giving an account of prodigies was admired; but sometime after Lampon was respected when they saw the faction of Thucydides overthrown, and all the authority in the hands of Pericles. The Historian says thereupon, that the diviner and the philosopher might be both in the right, the one in guessing at the effect, and the other in guessing at the cause. It was the philosopher's business, adds he, to explain whence and how that single horn was formed; but it was the diviner’s office to declare why it was formed, and what it portended. For they, who say that as soon as a natural reason is found out, the prodigy vanishes away, are not aware that they destroy artificial as well as celestial signs. Watch-lights upon towers, sun-dials, &c. depend upon certain causes, which act according to certain rules; yet they are appointed to signify certain things. This is the most specious and the strongest reason that can be alleged for the vulgar opinion which Anaxagoras opposed.

That a natural phenomenon may be a prodigy, or a sign of a future evil, it is not at all necessary that philosophers should not be able to give any account of it; for though they may explain it by the natural virtues of second causes, yet they may very well be appointed to presage something. Watch-lights are explained by

natural reasons, nevertheless they are a sign of the course which pilots ought to steer. It must be therefore confessed that Plutarch has defended the common opinion as learnedly as it can be maintained. The efficient cause, when found out, does not exclude the final cause, and even necessarily supposes it in every action directed by an intelligent being. What grounds therefore do philosophers go upon, when they maintain that eclipses, being a natural consequence of the motion of the planets, cannot be a presage of the death of a king; and that the overflowing of rivers being a natural effect of rains, or melted snows, cannot portend a sedition, the dethroning of a prince, or such like public calamities? I answer that they go upon this ground, that the effects of nature cannot be presages of future contingents, unless they be appointed for that end by a particular intelligent being. It is evident that the laws of nature being left in their general course, would never raise any towers, nor set up watch-lights upon them for the use of pilots. It must be the work of men; it is necessary that their particular wills should apply the virtue of bodies in such a manner as may relate to the end which they propose to themselves. On the other hand, it is manifest that the laws of nature being left in their general course cannot produce any meteors, or the overflowing of a river, whereby the inhabitants of a kingdom may know that there will arise a sedition in two or three years time, which will overthrow the monarchy. It is manifest that a particular intelligent being must needs form those meteors, or those great inundations, that they may be the signs of a change in government: but then it will be impossible to explain them by physical reasons; for that which depends upon the particular will of a man or an angel, is not the object of a science: the causes thereof cannot be found out by philosophy.

Thence it follows, that an event which may be

explained byphysical reasons, is not a presage of a future contingent, and that such a presage cannot be explained by the laws of nature. So that when Plutarch says, “that the diviner found out the final cause, and the philosopher the efficient cause,” he must suppose that a particular spirit so disposed the scull of that ram, that his brains being straitened, and ended sharping over against the middle of the forehead, produced but one horn, which came out in that very place. He must also suppose that this spirit modified the brains of that ram in such a manner, to the end that the Athenians might know that the faction of Pericles would overthrow that of Thucydides, and have all the power in its hands. But that supposition being contrary to the notions whereby we know that none but God can foresee future contingents, cannot be admitted; and so the vulgar opinion about presages cannot be adopted without acknowledging that God produces miraculously, and by a particular will all the natural effects which are looked upon as prognostics. According to that supposition miracles, properly so called, would be almost as frequent as natural effects; which is a prodigious absurdity. Observe, that if God had been willing to work a miracle, to inform the Athenians that one of their factions would be destroyed, he needed not straiten the brains of that ram. He would have produced a horn in the middle of the forehead without making any alteration in the brains, which would have been a stronger proof of the prodigy. However, I hope the reader will find no fault with me, for having made a reflection upon a thought of Plutarch, which is so specious that it might seem to most readers to be a solid one.—Art. Pericles.