B.

    § 5. It must, however, enquire not only what things are universally related to goodness, but also, what this predicate, to which they are related, is: …
    § 6. and the answer to this question is that it is indefinable …
    § 7. or simple: for if by definition be meant the analysis of an object of thought, only complex objects can be defined; …
    § 8. and of the three senses in which ‘definition’ can be used, this is the most important. …
    § 9. What is thus indefinable is not ‘the good’, or the whole of that which always possesses the predicate ‘good’, but this predicate itself. …
    § 10. ‘Good’, then, denotes one unique simple object of thought among innumerable others; but this object has very commonly been identified with some other—a fallacy which may be called ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ …
    § 11. and which reduces what is used as a fundamental principle of Ethics either to a tautology or to a statement about the meaning of a word. …
    § 12. The nature of this fallacy is easily recognised; …
    § 13. and if it were avoided, it would be plain that the only alternatives to the admission that ‘good’ is indefinable, are either that it is complex, or that there is no notion at all peculiar to Ethics—alternatives which can only be refuted by an appeal to inspection, but which can be so refuted.
    § 14. The ‘naturalistic fallacy’ illustrated by Bentham; and the importance of avoiding it pointed out. …